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MEMORANDUM

From: George H. Greene, Jr.
To: Mr. Brayton Wilbur *I Chairman Board of Directors Committee for a Free Asia*
Subject: A personal statement on your Memorandum of July 12th, concerning appointment of a President for Committee for a Free Asia.

Your concern to have the responsibility for the direction of the Committee's activities in competent hands is the same as mine -- that is, to accomplish the objectives of the Committee as efficiently, expeditiously and creditably as possible. The following comments are therefore offered as considerations with respect to the appointment of the chief executive officer of the Committee:

The field for the selection of this officer is extremely limited. Psychological warfare is a comparatively new subject of study in the United States. The principal direction of studies in that field among Americans has been toward Europe. Men of the type of C. D. Jackson who have gained psychological warfare experience as well as established reputations as business executives, so far as I know, are qualified only in the European field. Otherwise, the only men of experience and understanding of oriental psychological warfare are military men, who per se would create the wrong impression in the Far East if they were appointed to the chief executive's post of the Committee. Conceivably, a man qualified in the European field of psychological warfare could accomodate himself to the oriental environment in time, but time is extremely important because of the advanced stage of communist infiltration in all countries of the Far East.

Even if the Committee desires a well-known executive only to represent the Committee before the public in the United States - for which the need is appreciated - the effect in the Far East of the chief executive's public statements in the United States should be a matter of primary consideration. The communists would make more political capital out of a statement which appeared reasonable to the American public but which gave the wrong slant for an Asian audience, than could be gained by a successful public relations program in the United States. Witness, how the communists have twisted against us our E.C.A. program, missionary work and educational assistance in China, all of which could have redounded to our benefit - and still could - if accompanied by properly oriented psychological warfare. The

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importance of this aspect of the problem can readily be appreciated if you consider the psychological implications in the Far East of possible statements which the President of the Committee for a Free Asia may occasionally have to make in respect to: the positions of the colonial powers in Indo-China, Malaya and Indonesia; land reform in all the countries of Southeast Asia; the caste system and socialization problems in India, etc. etc. A public statement which disregarded Asian sensitivities on any of these problems would hurt the Committee's program more in Asia than it might possibly help in the United States.

You will recall that consideration was previously given to other candidates for the position of President of this Committee who were considered qualified in respect to their Far Eastern backgrounds -- among them being Claude Buss and George Taylor, both of whom have had experience in psychological warfare in the Far East, as well as many years of close association with Far Eastern cultures. One of these men might yet qualify, provided he straightens out his thinking, but you will recall a discussion which we had with mutual friends who proposed Mr. Buss as a candidate, in which they made it clear that he is unwilling to take sides against communism because of intellectual scruples; while George Taylor has expressed himself as being willing to compromise or appease the communists in the Far East.

Should a President be appointed without the necessary Far Eastern background his appearance before the public in the United States would have to be supported by intensive staff work on the part of the chiefs of the operating branches, from the Executive Vice President down to the Historical Research Bureau, to such an extent that the substantive program of the Committee would be adversely affected. This could result in a weakening of the organization in respect to the attainment of the desired objectives in Asia.

In my humble opinion, the Committee's desire to present a satisfactory front in the United States may be satisfied in one of the following ways:

1. By appointing - if he can be found - a President of established reputation who has had sufficient Far Eastern experience and background to qualify him to make authoritative public statements of Committee policy on Far Eastern questions;

2. By appointing as President a man with an established reputation in the Far East who is capable of gradually building up his reputation in the United States on the basis of substantive accomplishments in the work of the Committee and acquiring through experience a competence in public relations;

3. By finding a competent director of public relations who is qualified by Far Eastern experience (whose position with the Committee could be dignified with an appropriate title), and by permitting him to represent the Committee in public appearances, and otherwise at the same time limiting the public appearances of the President to delivering occasional prepared statements. (This is the method followed by C. D. Jackson who does not pretend to be a public speaker).

operation - it was a success in that many of the Asian correspondents then present have since either called in person or have written expressing their appreciation and interest in cooperating in our program. Nevertheless, this apparent set-back in local publicity has intensified the interest of Brayton and the Executive Committee in getting a "C.D. Jackson". From my standpoint, the program was a complete success p.w.-wise, as evidenced by the response of the Asian correspondents, by the rallying behind us of the local Chinese community and press, ~~and press~~, and the more positive and aggressive p.w. effort of our very able Chinese staff in Radio Free Asia. The fact that the program was not 100% successful in respect to Paul Smith's local competitors has apparently prejudiced the Executive Committee toward obtaining their own kind of public relations front for the organization as soon as possible. I am sending you herewith my draft letter to Clarvoe on this subject and a copy of my memo to Brayton. I feel we must face up to such minor set-backs, guard against them, but not let them confuse our perspective of the main target.

4. I came out here as the Washington representative to organize and implement this operation. I had your complete support and was the sole channel of communication between the Committee and Headquarters. Now that the local public relations aspect of the organization has become so emphasized, Brayton has established his own channel of communication and I feel an office boy to report such decisions as are made in Washington to Brayton, and to try to carry them out in the staff of the Committee. Since his recent return, Brayton holds Committee meetings without my presence and tells me only what he wants me to know about the decisions, while I still report to him faithfully in toto. Brayton even made the statement that the travel expense for Washington representatives to attend our Executive Committee meetings could not be justified from the standpoint of the Committee. Unless this attitude is properly brought into focus, I feel that you will have more of a local public relations operation than a program such as was originally intended. I need your support to get across the point that successful operations mainly toward Asia must be the basis of satisfactory public relations. Perhaps it would be advisable to get a public relations man who could make good public appearances easily, but it should be clear that that is his function and he should be one who can interpret the program of the Committee in terms of his own Far Eastern experience. Titles are immaterial but the bearers of the titles should appreciate their essential responsibilities in terms of their basic directives. It has come to the point now where it might be advisable for Frank or Allen to come here to give us a reading as to policy direction and allocation of responsibility as between the Executive Committee and Washington and the executive officer of the Committee, if you want this program to get back on the track.

Sincerely,

George
George H. Greene, Jr.

The public relations function of the Committee is to concentrate on assisting the Crusade for Freedom, to gain public support for the program of the Committee, particularly Radio Free Asia. This can be done by providing the Crusade with sufficient information to publicize the objectives and the newsworthy, practical accomplishments of the Committee. A careful balance between publicity in the United States and adequate propaganda interpretation in the Far East is necessary if we are to succeed in our principal objectives.

My only ambition is for the success of our program, and I am ready to bow out whenever I embarrass the Committee or fail to maintain the confidence of the Committee or its supporters. We are not here to build personal reputations by an extensive public relations program in the United States, but to do a public duty, which may only incidentally enhance our standing in the local community. It has always been my conviction that the objectives and gradual substantive accomplishments of the Committee would gain for the Committee all the support and public acclaim that might be desired. This has been proved to date. You will see from the report which is to be rendered to the Executive Committee on July 23rd that the substantive progress of the Committee (in spite of the limitations imposed by recruiting difficulties) has already gained for the Committee such a favorable reception both in the Far East and in the United States, that the future reputation of the Committee can only depend upon substantive accomplishments in Asia.